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The first Terrorist Threat Assesment Netherlands (Dreigingsbeeld 
Terrorisme Nederland, DTN) was published ten years ago. 
The letter of the Ministers of Justice and of the Interior and 
Kingdom Relations to the Speaker of the House of Representatives 
of 10 June 2005 states that “to place the measures taken [in the 
scope of counterterrorism] in the right context, this letter begins 
with an outline of the current threat assessment”. This heralded a 
new Dutch counterterrorism product provided by what was then a 
newcomer to the field: the National Coordinator for Counter- 
terrorism (Nationaal Coördinator Terrorismebestrijding, NCTb). This party 
had and has - now under the name National Coordinator for 
Counterterrorism and Security (Nationaal Coördinator 
Terrorismebestrijding en Veiligheid, NCTV) the task of directing and 
coordinating counterterrorist activities in the Netherlands.
The NCTb/NCTV is not only responsible for developing a clear and 
unambiguous counterterrorism policy, but also plays a key role in 
providing information on this subject to relevant politicians and 
policymakers, the general population and the business community. 
The public version of the DTN was and remains an important 
instrument for informing not only the general public but also the 
House of Representatives about the seriousness, scope and 
direction of the terrorist threat.2 In addition to this public version 
there is a Ministerial Confidential version and a State Secret version 
for the people bearing the most direct responsibility for the 
counterterrorism policy, such as the ministers and members of the 
Parliamentary Committee on the Intelligence and Security Services.
In recent years the DTN has become a familiar government report 
that can be read and downloaded3 on several websites, which forms 
the subject of many Parliamentary Questions and attracts a lot of 
media attention. This makes it an important governmental 
communication channel on the subjects of radicalisation, terrorism 
and counterterrorism.
2 Paul Abels, 2008, “Dreigingsbeeld terrorisme Nederland: nut en noodzaak van een 
‘all-source threat assessment’ bij terrorismebestrijding” in: E.R. Muller, U. Rosenthal, 
R. de Wijk (ed.), Terrorisme: Studies over terrorisme en terrorismebestrijding, 
(Kluwer: Deventer), p.542.
3 By way of illustration, DTNs 37, 38 and 38 were downloaded a total of 21,719 
times in 2015 (source: NCTV).
In this essay4, which was commissioned by the NCTV to mark the 
occasion of the conference “Threat Barometer. Ten years of Terrorist 
Threat Assessments for the Netherlands 2005-2015”, we address this 
and other aspects of the DTN and consider how this instrument has 
developed over the past decade. We also analyse the threat 
assessment itself: what were the key issues and trends in the area of 
terrorism? We then turn to the context in which the DTN is 
published. In the conclusions we set out the nature, form and 
content of the DTN. We also reflect on the future of the DTN.
However this essay begins with an answer to the question of why we 
actually have a DTN and how this threat assessment came about.
4 The sources we have consulted are the public summaries of the Terrorist 
Threat Assessment for the Netherlands as published by the NCTV since May 
2005 up to November 2015 (DTN1 to DTN40).
6
Threat Barometer  |  Ten Years of Terrorist Threat Assessment Netherlands 2005 - 2015 
2 Why a DTN?
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The recent history of terrorism and counterterrorism can be divided 
into a pre and post ‘9/11’ era. The attacks on the United States on the 
eleventh of September 2001 sent shock waves all over the world. 
Never before had there been an attack this magnitude. For some 
time the term ‘catastrophic terrorism’ was in vogue as a way of 
describing of the new threat. A lack of clarity about what citizens 
were facing led to a need for more information about the terrorist 
threat and to the idea of setting threat levels as a guide for citizens 
and governments. There was an especially pressing need for 
information in the United States.
This led in March 2002 to a presidential directive aimed at bringing 
about “a comprehensive and effective means to disseminate 
information regarding the risk of terrorist acts to Federal, State, and 
local authorities and to the American people”5. This was linked to a 
colour code system. – the ‘colour-coded advisory system’.
The system faced heavy criticism from the very beginning. Security 
experts, academics, journalists and non-governmental organisations 
highlighted the lack of clear criteria for the various threat levels. 
This made it impossible to independently establish whether a 
certain threat level was present. It was partly against this back-
ground that it was assumed, rightly or not, that political leaders 
manipulate the threat level for political purposes.6 Doubts were also 
expressed about the communicative value of the system if the threat 
is in practice always high (yellow or orange) and never low (blue or 
green). There comes a time when nobody takes them seriously any 
more, especially if there are few or no attacks. As well as that it 
turned out that raising (or lowering) the threat level had all sorts of 
side effects that some believed did not weigh up against the benefit. 
Examples include reduced confidence in the economy and specific 
implications for certain sectors, such as the travel or recreation 
industries. Raising the threat level could also create unnecessary 
anxiety and have all sorts of undesirable political consequences.7
Communication on threats
As shown above, communicating the terrorist threat is no easy task. 
Communication on terrorism should generally contribute to peace 
and calm whilst - in the event of a high threat level - also indicate 
that a threat is actually present. Government communication on 
this subject should ideally contribute to confidence in the govern-
5 The White House, 2002, Homeland Security Presidential Directive-3, 
consulted on 25-11-2015, georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/
releases/2002/03/20020312-5.html
6 See for example the following article about political pressure concerning 
threat levels: Associated Press, “Ridge says he was pressured to raise terror 
alert“,20-08-2009, http://www.nbcnews.com/id/32501273/ns/us_news-
security/t/ridge-says-he-was-pressured-raise-terror-alert/.
7 Taylor Grossman, 2015, The Problem of Warning: Homeland Security and the 
Evolution of Terrorism Advisory Systems, Thesis: Stanford University; Jacob 
N. Shapiro and Dary Kay Cohen, “Color Bind; Lessons from the Failed 
Homeland Security Advisory System”, International Security, vol. 32, no. 2. 
(Fall 2007), pp.121-154.
ment itself and support for the counterterrorist measures and the 
policy in general.
Perhaps even more difficult is the fact that communication on the 
terrorist threat may warn the general public against something, but 
will not offer any perspective for action.8 We are occasionally asked 
to be alert, but to what, and how? Moreover, a low threat level does 
not give the public any guarantee that no attack can take place and a 
high threat level does not necessarily mean that there will be an 
attack today or tomorrow. That, too, must be communicated, and 
this detracts from the whole idea of announcing a threat or high 
alert level. It is also very difficult for the security services and 
counterterrorist coordinators to determine the precise level of the 
threat. Certainly in Europe with its open borders it is not sufficient 
to consider the threat within national boundaries alone. Also, 
Dutch citizens and businesses abroad can fall victim to terrorism. 
And there are big differences between certain parts of the country, 
between demographic groupings and between branches of industry 
as regards the chance of becoming the target of or witnessing a 
terrorist attack. Bringing all this together under a single term - 
‘limited’, ‘elevated’, ‘vigilance’ - or colour - green, orange, red  
- is therefore an impossible task.
Another challenge is found in lowering the threat level. It is often 
difficult to explain why it is being lowered and what this means to 
the general public. Does it mean that people no longer need to be 
alert? And what does it mean to the government or the business 
community: fewer security measures, scaling down certain activities 
or even introducing cutbacks at the intelligence and security 
services? Put simply, communicating on the terrorist threat level 
gives rise to many questions that are not easy to answer.
Despite the challenges involved in communicating about terrorist 
threats and despite the limitations of the warning systems it is 
important to psychologically prepare the public for counterterrorist 
measures and the possibility of an attack. It is important to prevent 
terrorists from easily being able to take the public by surprise with 
an attack, thus intensifying the impact of their acts. The same 
applies to counterterrorist measures, such as extra security at 
stations. Members of the public have to know where they stand and 
to understand why certain - visible - measures are being taken. 
Communication on the terrorist threat, especially in the form of 
warning systems, can raise alertness among the population and 
thus give the police, judicial authorities and security services extra 
eyes and ears.9 Not only citizens, but also certain companies and 
event organisers are thus enabled to report suspicious behaviour, 
8 For more about the importance of giving citizens a perspective for action, see 
Edwin Bakker and Beatrice de Graaf, 2014, Towards a theory of fear 
management in the counterterrorism domain: a stocktaking approach. ICCT 
Research Paper, The Hague: ICCT, January 2014.
9 Anthony Bergin en Clare Murphy, 2015, Sounding the alarm. Terrorism threat 
communications with the Australian public, Australian Strategic Policy Institute.
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to report certain thefts or put extra security measures in place. 
Examples include an old NCTV television bulletin on the need to be 
alert to stolen chemicals (see figure 1).
 ..................................................................................................
Figure 1  NCTV public information for companies:  
“What can your company do against terrorism?”  
(source: NCTV)
The precise effect of this is unclear. Could this frustrate attacks, and 
how do terrorists respond to calls for alertness and extra security 
measures? There are no precise answers to these questions. There 
are however some well-known examples of members of the public 
or security guards who have prevented attacks or managed to reduce 
the number of victims. A case in point is the passenger on the 
Thalys train between Brussels and Paris who was suspicious about a 
conspicuous person who stayed for so long in the toilet with his 
luggage. He went to take a look and confronted him, whereupon 
this person pulled out a weapon, prompting the attentive passenger 
and others to take action in time. 
Examples 
Before turning to the Terrorist Threat Assessment for the Nether-
lands, it is worth first considering some examples from abroad.  
The alert system launched in the United States after 9/11 and 
discussed above formed the starting point for many countries.  
This system, the Security Advisory System of the Department of 
Homeland Security, was based on a successful warning system for 
forest fires in which the chance of one taking place was indicated by 
five colours (green, blue, yellow, orange and red). These colours 
were also used to indicate the potential seriousness of the terrorist 
threat. Each level was linked to certain measures, not all of which 
were communicated to the general public. Each level also featured 
certain recommendations for members of the public – communicated 
via the “Citizen Guidance on the Homeland Security Advisory 
System”10– and for federal government agencies.
– via de “Homeland Security Advisory System – Guidance for Federal 
Departments and Agencies”.11 In practice the colour was often set to 
orange - “high risk of terrorist attack” - and never to blue or green 
and did not provide the public with much practical information. In 
2011 the colour code system was replaced by the National Terrorism 
Advisory System12, which was intended to provide more detailed 
information about an elevated or imminent terrorist threat as and 
when necessary. An ‘alert’ such as this provides details about the 
nature of the threat, its duration and the threatened areas or 
sectors. No such public warning was given between 2011 and 
November 2015. There is also a secret or confidential variant for 
certain sectors, such as utilities companies, airports and financial 
institutions.13
The United Kingdom also operates a system of national terrorist 
threat levels. The level is based on evaluations and the extent and 
nature of the threat of international terrorism, and the Joint 
Terrorism Analysis Centre (JTAC) is responsible for this. The British 
Security Service (MI5) is responsible for assessing the domestic 
terrorist threat in the United Kingdom. This service focuses mainly 
on the situation in Northern Ireland.14 The system features two 
different terrorist alert levels: one for Northern Ireland and one for 
international terrorism. The JTAC not only sets the threat levels but 
also communicates them to the general public, relevant govern-
mental services and private partners.15 The public terrorist alert 
system in the United Kingdom features five levels: ‘low’, ‘moderate’, 
‘substantial’, ‘severe’ and ‘critical’. Since 2006 the information 
about the national threat level has been available on the websites of 
MI5 and the Home Office. In September 2010 the threat levels for 
terrorism in Northern Ireland were also made public.
France has a national terrorist alert system called Plan Vigipirate. 
The system has undergone a number of developments since 1995. 
10 The Western Governors’ Association (WGA), Homeland Security Advisory 
System--Guidance for Federal Departments and Agencies, consulted on  
24-11-2015, http: www.westgov.org/component/docman/doc_download/ 
281-department-of-homeland-security-national-security- threat-levels- 
unclassified?Itemid=.
11  The Western Governors’Association (WGA), Homeland Security Advisory 




12 Department of Homeland Security, National Terrorism Advisory System, 
consulted on 18-11-2015, http://www.dhs.gov/national-terrorism- 
advisory-system.
13 Department of Homeland Security, National Terrorism Advisory System, 
consulted on 18-11-2015, http://www.dhs.gov/national-terrorism-advisory- 
system.
14 MI5, 2015, What is Terrorism?, consulted on 24-11-2015, https://www.mi5. 
gov.uk/home/about-us/what-we-do/the-threats/terrorism.html.
15 IBP, 2013, United Kingdom Intelligence Services Handbook: Volume 1 
Strategic Information, Activities and Regulations, p.104.
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Up until February 2014 the system featured a four colour code 
model. After that the number of levels was restricted to a ‘vigilance’ 
category and an ‘imminent attack’ (‘alert attentat’) category. For the 
‘vigilance’ level various monitoring and screening measures are put 
in place, including surveillance in public transport and crowded 
areas and entry control at public buildings. This level can be raised 
for a certain location for a limited amount of time. The public are 
not necessarily informed of this. In the case of an ‘alerte attentat’ 
the French government takes special measures, such as the 
declaration of a state of emergency and the closure of national 
borders in November 2015. This can be implemented for a certain 
part of France or for the entire territory and is generally limited to a 
short period of time. The public are informed of this through 
official statements made by the president, the prime minister and/
or other ministers. There is also a government website that provides 
information about the situation and the threat level of the Plan 
Vigipirate.16
Since 2006 neighbouring Belgium has operated the integrated 
assessment of the terrorist threat in Belgium, formulated by the 
Threat Coordination and Analysis Agency (Orgaan voor de Coördi-
natie en de Analyse van de Dreiging, OCAD). The OCAD’s threat 
assessments are intended for the various political, administrative or 
judicial authorities with responsibility for security. These are the 
agencies that will ultimately have to take appropriate measures to 
avert an identified threat. The agency is placed under the joint 
authority of the Ministers of Home Affairs and Justice.17 This 
assessment also features threat levels: four categories, from ‘low’ to 
‘very serious’. The level remained ‘low’ for a long period of time, 
but in the autumn of 2015 and following the attacks in November 
2015 in particular it quickly rose from ‘medium’ to ‘very serious’ (see 
box 1). Level 4 – ‘very serious’ - is operated if the threat against 
people, groups or events is serious and very close.18
16 Le secrétariat général de la défense et de la sécurité nationale (SGDSN), 2014, 
De Vigilance, de prevention et de protection face aux menaces d’actions 
terrorists, consulted on 22-11-2015, http://www.sgdsn.gouv.fr/IMG/pdf/ 
Partie_publique_du_plan_Vigipirate_2014.pdf.
17 Vast Comité van Toezicht op de inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten, OCAD), 
Wat is het Coördinatieorgaan voor de dreigingsanalyse?, consulted on 24-11-2015, 
http://www.comiteri.be/index.php/nl/19-pages-nl-nl-1/54-wat-is- 
het-cooerdinatieorgaan-voor-de-dreigingsanalyse.
18 Crisiscentrum, Terroristische dreiging, consulted on 22-11-2015,  
http://crisiscentrum.be/nl/inhoud/terroristische-dreiging.
..................................................................................................
 Box 1 Raising of the threat level in Belgium: from  
‘medium’ to ‘very serious’ 
In March 2015 the terrorist threat level in Belgium was level 
2, which calls for general alertness.  The OCAD raised this to 
level 3 during that month for certain specific institutions 
and locations. The Belgian connection to the attacks in Paris 
during the night of 13/14 November 2015 resulted in the 
level being raised to 3 for the whole of Belgium, mainly in 
response to the fact that one or more of the perpetrators 
had escaped and crossed the French/Belgian border. A week 
later the threat level in the Brussels Region was scaled up to 
4, the highest level. This level means that the threat is 
‘serious and very close’. The measures taken included 
stopping the underground railway system and closing all 
cafes and restaurants in the capital, in which the streets 
were dominated by a military presence.
10
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Following the attacks on 11 September 2001 a need arose among the 
Dutch public for a clearer understanding of the nature and scope of 
the terrorist threat and the measures to protect the population. The 
government responded to this with various letters to the House of 
Representatives and progress reports on the action plan Counter-
terrorism and Security, which was drawn up a few weeks after the 
attacks. The General Consultation of the House of Representatives 
on terrorism and counterterrorism provided information about the 
nature and scope of the threat and the policy adopted in that 
regard. Also, the National Security Service, known since May 2002 as 
the General Intelligence and Security Service, provided information 
about the terrorist threat in the Netherlands in the form of public 
reports and a public annual report. However, in 2003 the House of 
Representatives, in the person of PvdA member Kalsbeek, called for 
a ‘well-considered communication strategy’ for the general public. 
The Ministers of the Interior and Justice endorsed the need to 
properly inform and alert Dutch society on matters concerning the 
risk of an attack. They also stressed the importance of the political 
and societal debate on terrorism and how the government should 
go about countering it.19
National alert system
The need for insight and information about the terrorist threat 
became even greater following the attacks in Madrid in 2004. In 
response to this terrorist attack the Ministers of Justice and the 
Interior and Kingdom Relations (BZK) announced in September 
2004 that National Alert System (NAS) would have to be put in place 
to inform the public authorities, the business community and the 
public about current threats and risks.20 The government eventually 
decided - in anticipation of the broader NAS - only to call into being 
a Counterterrorism Alert System (ATb) for terrorist threats. This ATb 
can be used to alert a selection of companies and public authorities 
to an elevated terrorist threat. This makes it possible for them to 
put predetermined security measures in place.21 Far from offering a 
general threat assessment it is a warning system specifically for 
public and private sectors organisations such as airports, the 
chemical industry and the telecom sector.22
It was not until after this that an alert system for the general public 
was put in place. This was initiated by a newcomer brought into 
being following the attacks in Madrid: the National Coordinator for 
Counterterrorism (NCTb). The NCTb, in the person of Tjibbe Joustra, 
was tasked with coordinating the activities of the police, judiciary, 
security services and other relevant counterterrorism organisations. 
19 Paul Abels, 2012, De brede benadering in de terrorismebestrijding: oorsprong, 
ontwikkeling en stand van zaken, https://www.nctv.nl/Images/brede-benade-
ring-in-de-terrorismebestrijding_tcm126-443897.pdf, p.2.
20 Parliamentary papers 31499 no. 2, Parliamentary year 2007-2008, 
Counterterrorism Alert System, published on 3-7-2008.
21  Parliamentary papers 31499 no. 2, Parliamentary year 2007-2008, 
Counterterrorism Alert System, published on 3-7-2008.
22 National Coordinator for Counterterrorism and Security (NCTV), 
Counterterrorism Alert System, consulted on 24-11-2015, https://www.nctv.
nl/onderwerpen/tb/atb/.
The regulations of the Ministry of Justice and the Ministry of the 
Interior and Kingdom Relations establishing the NCTb state that 
this coordinator is also tasked with “gathering, combining and 
refining information received from intelligence services and 
administrative and scientific sources for the integral terrorist 
analyses and threat assessments”.23
On being appointed Joustra concluded that it was not possible to 
coordinate the terrorism policy without having access to an 
“up-to-date and periodically adjusted general threat assessment”.24 
In his view an assessment along these lines would have to serve as a 
“substantive basis and guideline” for counterterrorism in the 
Netherlands.25
It was against this background that the principle parties involved in 
this in the Netherlands were asked to provide analysed information 
four times a year on developments relevant to outlining the current 
terrorist threat in the Netherlands. The first threat assessment was 
drawn up in 2005, in which contributions of relevant parties were 
supplemented with the expertise of the Knowledge & Analysis 
directorate of the NCTb.26 As a result of this there was no National 
Alert System but rather two different systems: the ATb and the DTN 
(see appendix II for the difference between the ATb and the DTN). 
For this rest of this essay we focus on the DTN in general and the 
public version of it in particular.
Broader view
The Terrorist Threat Assessment for the Netherlands (DTN) is a 
global assessment of the national and international terrorist threat 
against the Netherlands and Dutch interests abroad. The Dutch 
‘broad approach’ to counterterrorism is an important starting point 
in this regard. The foundation of this approach was put in place by 
the AIVD at the end of the previous millennium. It is aimed at “the 
early detection of radicalisation processes among groups and 
individuals to prevent them, by means of targeted intervention 
strategies, from committing terrorist acts”.27
According to terrorism expert Paul Abels the consequence of the 
broad approach is that the DTN not only addresses terrorists, their 
networks, intentions and activities but also the radicalisation 
processes within various groups and environmental factors such 
as polarisation.28 These groups, processes and factors are not 
limited in terms of the actions or effects to the territory of the 
Netherlands. Developments abroad and Dutch activities beyond 
23 J.P.H. Donner and J.W. Remkes, 2005, “Regulations establishing the National 
Counterterrorism Coordinator”, Government Gazette, Volume 2005, no. 127, p. 1.
24 Abels, “Dreigingsbeeld Terrorisme Nederland”, p.537.
25 Idem, p.537.
26 Idem, p.537.
27 Paul Abels, 2012, De brede benadering in de terrorismebestrijding: 
oorsprong, ontwikkeling en stand van zaken, https://www.nctv.nl/Images/
brede-benadering-in-de- terrorismebestrijding_tcm126-443897.pdf, p.1.
28 Abels, “Dreigingsbeeld Terrorisme Nederland”, p.537.
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the national borders and the defence policy also have a major 
effect on the Dutch threat assessment. These matters are therefore 
also included in the DTN.
A broad approach to terrorism also means that Dutch factors and 
processes that could limit the threat are included in the Terrorist 
Threat Assessment for the Netherlands. According to Abels it is of 
great importance “also to bear in mind the extent to which a 
government, society and specific/relevant demographic groupings are 
willing and able to put up resistance against certain threats to which 
they are exposed”.29
It is against this background that developments concerning societal 
resistance are described in the DTN. In the first DTNs in particular, 
attention was also paid to the resistance of the government in the 
form of practical countermeasures.
Realisation
According to Paul Abels the Terrorist Threat Assessment for the 
Netherlands is what is known as an ‘all source threat assessment’.  
The general threat level for the Netherlands and Dutch interests 
abroad is determined on the basis of a broad range of information. 
For the DTN use is made of classified information from services 
charged with counterterrorism and/or countering radicalisation 
processes. The AIVD also of course makes an important contribution, 
in which the primary developments concerning the current threat 
assessment are outlined. But the Dutch Military Intelligence and 
Security Service (MIVD) also makes a substantial contribution, as do 
foreign sister services of the NCTV such as the JTAC, and the National 
Intelligence Service (DLIO), which is a division of the National Police. 
Information from sources in the public domain, administrative 
sources, scientific sources and analyses of the NCTV itself are used as 
well.30 There are various other government services that also 
contribute to specific areas. They include the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs for the foreign component, or services such as the Naturalizati-
on and Immigration Service (IND), Customs, the Fiscal Intelligence 
and Investigation Service and Economic Investigation Service 
(FIOD-ECD) and the Public Prosecution Service. Finally, municipal 
services with a security task provide information important to 
drawing up the DTN.
In the ‘Terrorism’ book edited by Erwin Muller, Uri Rosenthal and Rob 
de Wijk, Paul Abels describes the realisation of the DTN.
“The analysts of the NCTV study and compare all of these contributions to the DTN. 
They add to this insights and information that they have gleaned from the classified 
information shared with the NCTV, open sources and scientific literature on the 
various themes and produce an integral draft text. The draft DTN is then sent back 
to the services that delivered the information for comment. It is possible that the 
29 Idem, p.537.
30 National Coordinator for Counterterrorism and Security (NCTV), Terrorist 
Threat Assessment for the Netherlands, consulted on 24-11-2015,  
https://www.nctv.nl/onderwerpen/tb/atb/.
analyses of these parties yield different - sometimes conflicting - insights on one or 
more aspects. In that case the specialists involved sit down together to consider each 
other’s analyses once again and listen to the underlying arguments. The idea of this 
is not to arrive at negotiated conclusions but to tighten up the insights. Since 
counterterrorism usually involves probability reasoning with outcomes that cannot 
be mathematically defined, there may be times when the various parties maintain 
their viewpoints even after the discussion. In that case the difference in opinion is 
not suppressed in the text but explicitly mentioned.” 31
Abels regards the multiplicity of sources and parties involved in the 
production of the threat assessment as being something that hugely 
enhances its quality. This applies especially to the exchanges and peer 
reviews of the analytical insights between the various parties. This 
approach rules out the possibility of misinterpreting the information 
provided. The ultimate threat assessment and threat level are set not 
by the minister but by the NCTV. This independence is fairly unique. 
In fact, it is not held for any official product other than those of 
advisory bodies such as the Dutch Scientific Council for Government 
Policy (WRR) or the Advisory Council on International Affairs (AIV). 
This independence guarantees that the threat assessments do not 
become politicised. The policy subsequently linked to the DTN is of 
course a consequence of political choices, which makes it not an 
independent but a political product. This is the underlying reason for 
the division between the DTN and the Parliamentary Letter with 
policy implications.
Users
The DTN is intended first and foremost as a substantive basis for 
counterterrorism in the Netherlands and for the protection of the 
Netherlands and Dutch interests abroad. The parties bearing the most 
direct responsibility for this policy are the Joint Counter-terrorism 
Committee (GCT), the Netherlands Joint Intelligence Committee 
(CVIN), the Council for Intelligence and Security Services (RIV) 
- a sub-council of the Council of Ministers and the members of the 
Intelligence and Security Services Committee of the House of 
Representatives (CIVD). They receive the most detailed version: the 
State Secret Confidential (or higher) classified version. This version 
can also be sent to the EU Counter-Terrorism Coordinator following 
consultation with the AIVD and, if relevant, with the MIVD.
Following discussion in the RIVD a departmental confidential 
classified version of the DTN is drawn up.32 This version is 
distributed among the King’s Commissioners, the mayors of the 
biggest local authorities, the chief constables, the chief public 
prosecutors, and a number of other relevant national services. 
In some cases it is also shared with sister organisations of the NCTV 
abroad. The most sensitive passages are removed from the ministerial 
confidential versions, not least in order to protect sources.
The public version of the DTN is sent by the ministers to the House 
of Representatives and is made available to all citizens via the NCTV 
31 Abels, “Dreigingsbeeld Terrorisme Nederland”, p.539.
32 Abels, “Dreigingsbeeld Terrorisme Nederland”, p.541.
 13
Threat Barometer  |  Ten Years of Terrorist Threat Assessment Netherlands 2005 - 2015 
website. With this website, with which a start was made in 2005, the 
Dutch government is following the example of countries such as the 
United States and the United Kingdom, where citizens were already 
kept informed of the terrorist threat and counterterrorist measures 
online in previous years.
From its inception onwards the DTN attracted a lot of media 
attention, also when the website was launched. “With the website 
that was opened on Friday by the National Counterterrorism 
Coordinator Tjibbe Joustra, the ministries of Justice and the Interior 
have provided a central overview of the terrorist threat. Up until 
now that information was fragmented among various ministries 
and intelligence services”, stated the national newspaper 
De Volkskrant on 19 September 2005.33
Each newly published threat assessment can also count on media 
attention. In most cases the release of a DTN is marked by a press 
conference and a more detailed explanation by the NCTV in the 
media. A new DTN and its covering letter by the government with 
policy measures virtually always gives rise to a debate in the House 
of Representatives, e.g. in the permanent committees for the 
Interior and Kingdom Relations, Defence, Security and Justice, or 
Social Affairs and Employment.
Threat assessment and threat levels
The Terrorist Threat Assessment for the Netherlands (DTN) is in 
essence a quality assessment of key points. In many respects it takes 
the form of a trend analysis that provides general information 
about the direction taken in the development of the terrorist threat. 
According to Abels the DTN is by no means a risk assessment “in 
which the nature, seriousness and probability of a threat (the threat 
assessment) is set off against an estimate of the resistance presented 
against such a threat in the form of security measures and/or the 
degree of security awareness among potential victims, targets or 
certain demographic groupings and communities (the resistance 
assessment)”.34 Nor are any policy recommendations made in the 
DTN. Any policy proposals and policy measures are given a separate 
covering letter from the government to the House of 
Representatives.
One aspect of a risk assessment has however found its way into the 
DTN: the notion of threat levels to indicate the terrorist threat 
against the Netherlands. In 2005 the NCTb opted for a system 
featuring four levels and for the terms ‘minimum’, ‘limited’, 
‘substantial’ and ‘critical’. These indicate the general probability of 
the Netherlands being subjected to a terrorist attack.35 The level is 
determined on the basis of a non-exhaustive list of factors that 
sometimes differ between levels.
33 “Website geeft informatie over terreur”, De Volkskrant, 19 September 2005.
34 Abels, “Dreigingsbeeld Terrorisme Nederland”, p.542.
35 National Coordinator for Counterterrorism and Security (NCTV), DTN vs. ATb, 
consulted on 24-11-2015, https://www.nctv.nl/onderwerpen/tb/dtn-atb.aspx.
The various threat levels are regarded by the NCTV as bandwidths 
without any hard dividing lines. For this reason there may be 
fluctuations in the “nature, scope and background of the threat, 
without there being any reason to opt for a different general threat 
level”.36 It is notable that the level ‘critical’ is different in many 
respects from the other three levels.
The category ‘critical’ relates to a concrete indication that an attack 
will take place or a situation in which an attack has just taken place. 
The other three levels concern the extent to which an unknown or 
known threat has come about. As mentioned above, the dividing 
line between them is not especially hard but moves between 
conceivable to predictable and from an unknown to a known threat 
based on the extent to which more concrete information is 
available on developments, possible perpetrators, targets, and so 
on. Practical experience over the past ten years has shown that only 
two of the four levels are used: ‘limited’ and ‘substantial’, as shown 
in the analysis of ten years of the DTN below.
36 National Coordinator for Counterterrorism and Security (NCTV), Opbouw 4 
dreigingsniveaus, consulted on 24-11-2015, https://www.nctv.nl/ onderwerpen/
tb/dtn/opbouw/. See also appendix III.
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In this chapter we consider the content of the forty public 
summaries of the Terrorist Threat Assessment for the Netherlands 
published between May 2005 and November 2015. What were the 
central themes? What was regarded as being a threat? Which new 
phenomena and terms were discussed and applied to describe the 
threat? In this chapter we will provide a summary of the develop-
ment of ten years of the DTN, specifically addressing the following 
themes: a comparison of DTNs 1 and 40, use of terminology, the 
who and what of the threat, raising and lowering of the threat, and 
the specific cases of CBRN terrorism, Salafism, foreign fighters and 
resistance.
2015: 2005, but ten years later?
Ten years ago, in 2005, when the first Terrorist Threat Assessment 
for the Netherlands was published, Europe was undergoing a 
turbulent period. The previous year had seen the terrorist attacks by 
Al Qaida in Madrid, in which nearly two hundred people lost their 
lives. In Netherlands feelings were running high about the attack of 
Theo van Gogh in 2004 and concerns about polarisation. The 
attacks in London took place two months after the publication of 
the first DTN. The threat of international jihadist networks with a 
strong ‘home-grown’ component was a serious cause of concern in 
the next threat assessment. This centred on the “transnational 
interweaving of both local and international networks, the 
international aspect of the jihadist battle zones such as that in Iraq, 
and the implications of the attacks in London.37 Now, ten years later, 
the sad fact is that little appears to have changed: we can now 
simply add Syria to Iraq, and these days it is the implications of the 
attacks in Paris rather than those in London that are causing most 
concern.
This would at first sight seem to suggest continuity, with the attacks 
in Paris being ‘merely’ another chapter in the development of 
jihadism in Europe. But when we consider the small number of 
large-scale terrorist attacks that have taken place in the past decade, 
this does not chime with reality. Moreover, the most deadly attack 
that took place in Europe between 2005 and 13 November 2015 had 
nothing to do with a jihadist network or individual, but concerned 
a person of a completely different order: the right-wing extremist 
terrorist Anders Breivik, who murdered almost eighty people in 
Norway in 2011. In the meantime the threat level has been raised 
and lowered again on a number of occasions: From ‘substantial’ in 
DTN 1 to ‘limited in DTN 8 (March 2007), to ‘substantial’ in DTN 12 
(March 2008) to ‘limited’ in DTN 19 (November 2009), only to be 
raised again to ‘substantial in DTN 32 (March 2013) (See figure 3.) 
The threat in Europe and - accordingly- that in the Netherlands, has 
in some cases taken on different forms and been given a different 
scope, in much the same way as the policy.  
37 NCTV, Terrorist Threat Assessment for the Netherlands 2, p.1. Reading guide: 
from this point onwards this will be abbreviated to “DTN + number”.
DTN 1 and DTN 40: a comparison
Before summarising the development of the DTN during the past 
ten years, we first make a comparison between the first and most 
recent DTN (DTN 40). The first impression is that there are strikingly 
abundant similarities. The emphasis in DTN 1 is placed on the 
“Islamic terrorist threat”38, whereas DTN 40 focuses more on the 
“jihadist threat”, where only a different term is used for a similar 
phenomenon. Another similarity is that both DTNs make reference 
to the return of jihadists from conflict areas. In DTN 1 these people 
are referred to as “Iraq jihadists”, while DTN 40 speaks of “Dutch-
speaking jihadists in Syria and Iraq”. DTN 40 adds to this that a 
threat is posed not only by those who travel abroad for jihadist 
purposes but also by those who choose instead to remain in the 
Netherlands.
Despite that, there are a number of differences to be found. It is 
stated in DTN 1 that the threat to the Netherlands is inextricably 
linked with international developments, where Dutch participation 
in the Afghanistan mission contributes to a high international 
profile. It is also stated that the current threat is still in fact found 
mainly in local networks.39
DTN 40 centres not so much on local networks but more on the 
threat posed by the terrorist organisation Islamic State in Iraq and 
Syria (ISIS). It is noted that this could have to do with both national 
and international networks and with lone actor terrorists.40 DTN 1 
closely addresses the theme of radicalisation. It states that “radicali-
sation could contribute to terrorism and successful recruitment”. 
It is noted that the motives for young people to radicalise have 
shifted from a link with the conflict areas to a general aversion to 
the West, which has been intensified by the actions of the 
Netherlands in Afghanistan and Iraq.41 It is also asserted that the 
radicalisation process within the Muslim communications is fed by 
the “xenophobia and in some cases racist attitude and acts of 
violence of right-wing groups of young people”.42 The rise in 
hostility could lead even to “moderate Muslims” defining their 
identity more strongly in religious terms.43 DTN 40 also pays a 
relatively large amount of attention to the development of 
right-wing extremism. This is being caused mainly by the refugee 
crisis and the attack on a mayoral candidate in Germany.
38 DTN 1, p.2.
39 DTN 1, p.2.
40 DTN 40, p.1.
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Form and use of terminology
Another notable difference between DTN 1 and DTN 40 is the form. 
There has been a clear shift in the scope of the description of the 
threat and of the measures. In DTN 1 the threat assessment takes up 
two pages, and the details of the policy and measures in that area 
covered no fewer than fourteen. In DTN 40 the public summary has 
been reduced to five pages, and the measures are no longer 
included as part of the DTN. Since DTN 32 the policy implications 
have in many cases been placed in a separate document.
If we compare the use of terminology in DTN 1 and DTN 40 we see 
that there are a number of interesting differences (see figure 2). 
Words such as ‘terrorism’, ‘counterterrorism’ and ‘terrorist’ are used 
a total of eighty times compared with just six in DTN 40. Also, the 
first DTN mentioned measures more than twenty times, whereas 
this arose only once in DTN 40. Another striking difference is that 
the term ‘jihadists’ or ‘jihadist’ was not in the vocabulary of the first 
DTN, but was used as many as 33 times in the most recent DTN. 
Finally, it will come as no surprise that ISIS occupies a central 
position in DTN 40: after “the Netherlands” it is the most commonly 
used word (50 times). This gives an indication of the extent to which 
our current threat assessment, also just before the attacks in Paris, 
is related to the developments concerning ISIS.
..................................................................................................
 Figure 2  Use of terminology in DTN 1 and DTN 40 
 
Words44 Number Number Total
the netherlands 26 36 62
isis 0 50 50
threat 16 19 35
parliament 32 1 33
nctb 32 0 32
attacks 11 20 31
terrorism 27 2 29
terrorist 25 4 29
counterterrorism 28 0 28
attack 15 11 26
measures 23 1 24
minister 24 0 24
syria 0 24 24
approach 20 1 21
information 20 0 20
jihadist 0 19 19
west 3 14 17
eu 16 0 16
european 12 4 16
possible 8 8 16
persons 9 7 16
resources 15 0 15
jihadists 0 14 14
dutch 7 7 14
police 13 1 14
General impression of ten years of the  
DTN - levels
The above analysis was no more than a brief comparison of DTN 1 
and DTN 40. Between them there were another 38 DTNs, and all 
sorts of developments in the area of radicalisation and terrorism. 
Given below is an analysis of all forty DTNs. We start by discussing 
the levels: what threat levels have been operated throughout the 
years, and how were the changes to the levels explained? The threat 
level has changed four times since the first DTN in 2005
(see figure 3).
44 Not including articles and irrelevant verbs, without capitals, with the aid of 
the software program Atlas.ti.
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..................................................................................................
 Figure 3  Threat levels over the course of years  
DTN number Date of publication Level
DTN 1 to DTN 7 May 2005  Substantial
DTN 8 to DTN 11 March 2007 Limited
DTN 12 to DTN 18 March 2008 Substantial
DTN 19 to DTN 31 November 2009 Limited
DTN 32 to DTN 40 March 2013 - present Substantial
Following the initial ‘substantial’ level, it was lowered twice to 
‘limited’ and raised twice to ‘substantial’. It is interesting to note how 
this change is worded. In DTN 8 of March 2007 it is explained that the 
threat level is being adjusted downwards owing to the reduction in 
the concrete domestic threat, the non-concrete nature of the 
potential threats (to which we will return later) and the increased 
amount of resistance in the Muslim community.45 It was added to the 
explanation of this lowering of the level that this would have no 
direct implications for concrete security measures and that nor 
should this have any such implications, since another system is 
operated to determine the measures.
In DTN 19 of November 2009 it seems almost as though the NCTV is 
troubled by this lowering of the level and that the coordinator sees 
the need to provide an especially clear explanation of which 
implications this does and does not have. The reason for lowering the 
threat level in DTN 19 is that the Netherlands is less in the spotlight of 
the international jihadist networks and that the domestic networks 
have been relatively peaceful “for a number of years now”.46 
 It is stated in the concluding paragraph of DTN 19 that this is “not so 
much the final classification of the threat (the threat level), but an 
underlying periodic outline of the threat-relevant developments 
forming the substantive basis of the Dutch counterterrorism policy”, 
which immediately qualifies the importance of the threat level.47 
 It is also added that this lowering of the level does not imply that the 
development of policy will come to a halt and that it is not known 
how long this level can be maintained. When the threat level is raised, 
as in DTN 12 for example, no such passages are found. All that is 
explained is why the threat level has been raised (increased predicta-
bility) without mentioning the potential implications. When the level 
is raised in DTN 32 nothing about this is mentioned in the public 
summary either.
Another notable point about the levels is that there is not always 
much apparent difference between the DTNs for the level ‘limited’ 
and those labelled ‘substantial’. There are also question marks 
concerning the level bandwidths. In the early years of the DTN the 
term ‘substantial’ ‘was linked to a situation that appears a good deal 
less threatening that the current level with the same label’. 
45 DTN 8, p.2.
46 DTN 19, p.1.
47 Idem, p.4.
In December 2008 coordinator Tjibbe Joustra appears himself to 
indicate that there are big differences in the bandwidth ‘substantial’ 
when he uses the term ‘substantial plus’ when referred to DTN 15.48 
Focus
What were the threats that occupied a central position in the 
Terrorist Threat Assessment for the Netherlands during the past ten 
years, and where did they come from? An initial observation is that 
the DTN has focused very sharply on the jihadist threat from the very 
beginning. Given the background to the realisation of the DTN 
there is a good explanation for this: in 2004 and 2005 the threat of 
jihadist terrorism in Europe was greater than ever before. Despite 
that, this lessened greatly in the period from 2007 - 2013 in 
particular, while the DTN focused just as specifically on the threat of 
jihadism. During the first years of the DTN the focus is placed 
mainly on international or local networks. The threat of a lone actor 
terrorist is added in DTN 20 (April 2010). According to the levels 
operated the threat in the Netherlands is initially regarded as being 
strongly dependent on the presence and organisational strength of 
domestic jihadist networks. But plenty of attention is still paid to 
developments concerning jihadism outside of the Netherlands. 
The DTN often makes mention of what is happening with Al Qaida 
(up until 2013) and more recently ISIS as well. Precisely how those 
developments affect the domestic threat is not always clear, 
although it is explained on several occasions that the threat in the 
Netherlands is derived largely from the international threat.
This focus on jihadism is especially notable in some threat 
assessments. The biggest attack in the period from 2005 - 2014 was 
carried out in July 2011 by right-wing extremist Anders Breivik. 
The following DTN 26 opens by observing that the threat level in 
the Netherlands remains limited and that the threat of jihadist 
networks remains low, that the resistance against violent radicalism 
and terrorism remains as high as ever and that Dutch jihadists make 
(often unsuccessful) attempts to travel to jihadist combat areas. 
It is only then that it is pointed out that the attacks in Norway “show 
that the domestic terrorist threat in Western countries is not only 
determined by jihadist terrorism. There also other ideological 
convictions that can manifest themselves in terrorist violence”.49 
 But this is immediately followed by the sentence that the “most 
important component of the threat to the Netherlands and its 
interests (…) remains the international jihadist threat”.50 
 Although the DTN then goes on to discuss the attacks in Norway, 
it is notable that even following almost eighty fatalities from 
different quarters the DTN is virtually exclusively about jihadism.
As pointed out in the previous paragraph, raising or lowering the 
threat level has been linked without exception to developments 
48 NRC Handelsblad “Joustra: terreurdreiging Nederland groter dan ooit”. 3-12-2008, 
http://vorige.nrc.nl/binnenland/article2081327.ece/Joustra_ 
terreurdreiging_Nederland_groter_dan_ooit.
49 DTN 26, p.1.
50 Idem, p.1.
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concerning jihadist terrorism. By way of illustration, in March 2007, 
in DTN 8, the threat level was lowered because the domestic jihadist 
networks were being increasingly weakened and the Muslim 
community was showing growing resistance. In recent years the 
emphasis has shifted strongly towards international networks, 
perhaps owing to the absence of domestic jihadist networks. It is 
stated in DTN 26 that “the most important component of the threat to 
the Netherlands and its interests (…) remains the international 
jihadist threat”.51I t is interesting to note that this not only concerns 
the presence of networks or individuals, but also phenomena such as 
‘radicalisation’ and ‘resistance’. This is in fact always about radicalisa-
tion and resistance in the Dutch Muslim community. In DTN 8 it is 
decided to lower the threat level owing (among other things) to the 
increased resistance among this population group. It is also notable 
that in some DTNs the threat level is linked directly to certain 
occurrences. DTNs 12 to 15 make frequent reference to the announce-
ment and launch of the film Fitna of the PVV party leader Geert 
Wilders.52 
As well as the threat from the jihadist angle, other types of threat are 
sporadically addressed. This is reflected mainly in developments 
concerning left- and right-wing extremists and animal rights activists. 
The organisational capacity of these groups is generally regarded as 
being low. Also, the activities of these groups generally only barely 
pose a security threat. In DTN 18, for example, it is noted that there 
have been only few violent incidents involving animal rights 
extremists. Organisations such as the Animal Liberation Front (ALF) 
were however involved in false bomb alerts.53 There were also 
“skirmishes” between animal rights activities of left- and right-wing 
extremists, but it did not amount to much more than that.54 In most 
cases these incidents were placed under the heading of political 
activism because they did not involve violence against people.
There was however a single case involving a potential security threat. 
DTN 9 reports that it has once again proved important to recognise 
extreme right-wing violence: “incidents showcase the growing 
self-confidence and violent tendencies of the extreme-right in the 
Netherlands as well as the polarisation between dissidents in the 
Netherlands”. 55 It is stated in the next threat assessment that there has 
been an increase in the number of reports of right-wing extremism, 
but that the use of violence has remained relatively “stable”, but 
without really explaining the level and seriousness of that use of 
violence.56 It is however reported that fourteen “inter-ethnic” acts of 
violence were perpetrated by or against young people, in which 
right-wing extremists were the aggressors in most cases.57 
51 Idem, p.2.
52 see for example page 1 of DTN 14.
53 DTN 18, p.5
54 Idem, p.5.
55 DTN 9, p.3.
56 DTN 10, p.3.
57 Idem, p.3.
It is added to this that of the larger group of people only “a few 
hundred are actually affiliated with an extreme right-wing party or 
group such as Blood and Honour”.58 But this does appear to be a 
very large group, about which the threat assessment comments that 
the high level of “xenophobic and nationalistic ideas and utterances 
against Muslims, people of a different skin colour and Jews among 
large groupings form a matter of concern”.59 However this theme is 
not followed up to any great extent in subsequent threat 
assessments.
The threat assessment and incidents
Although there has been little terrorist-related violence in the 
Netherlands during the past ten years, there have been some 
incidents in the Netherlands and Europe that have affected the 
Dutch security situation. For these incidents we have consulted the 
reports of Europol, the EU Terrorism Situation & Trend Report 
(TE-SAT) and the incidents involving fatalities reported in the Global 
Terrorism database of Maryland University.60 How are these 
incidents reflected in the DTNs?
The first DTNs were released at a time when terrorists were causing a 
great deal of commotion in the Netherlands and the rest of Europe 
with the attacks in Madrid and London and the murder of Theo Van 
Gogh in the Netherlands. A lot of attention was therefore also paid 
to the presence of local and international jihadist networks in the 
first threat assessments. The launch of Wilders’ film Fitna in 2008 
was covered in detail in several DTNs, for example. DTN 13 points 
out that the film led to the international profile of the Netherlands 
being raised, but that the adverse effects have remained limited and 
that the Islamic community in the Netherlands had in fact shown 
resistance. Most of the jihadist attacks and plots in the Netherlands 
and Europe, and even in the United States, are directly reflected in 
the DTNs. They report, for example, on the “Fort Hood Shooting”, 
the “Christmas Day Bomber”, the “Stockholm Bomber”, the plot in 
Germany to blow up trains, the attack on the American military base 
in Germany, the failed attack on a cartoonist in Denmark, and, in 
recent years, the attacks on the Jewish Museum in Copenhagen, 
Charlie Hebdo and the failed attack on the Thalys train. In response 
to a number of plots in the United States around 2009 it is reported 
that the situation demonstrates the “multiformity” of the interna-
tional terrorist threat.61 But it is noted at the same time that there is 
a “decline in home-grown terrorism in the Netherlands, whereas 
home-grown American terrorism is increasing”.62 The NCTV has 
identified a shift from violence perpetrated by lone actor terrorists 
in the US to more organised networks. Despite this, the Netherlands 
58 Idem, p.3.
59 Idem, p.3.
60 For Europol, EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Report (TE-SAT), see https://
www.europol.europa.eu/latest_publications/37en and for GTD see National 
Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, Global 
Terrorism Database, http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/.
61 DTN 20, p.2
62 Idem, p.3.
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needs to take account of the “the wide-ranging radicalisation of 
lone actor terrorists”, especially in the light of the Islam debate and 
the possibility of mounting polarisation”.63 
However, non-jihadist violent or terrorist incidents are much less 
clearly reflected in the threat assessments. A case in point is the 
incident on Queen’s Day in 2009 when Karst Tates drove a car into a 
crowd with the intention of harming members of the Royal Family. 
Despite the political motive of this act, which is also attested to in 
the last words of Karst Tates, this incident was not labelled as 
“terrorism”. This was however registered as such in the Global 
Terrorism Database.64 This attack resulted in 7 civilian fatalities: 
the attack with the highest number of civilian victims in the 
Netherlands. For that reason it is notable that the incident is not 
even mentioned in DTN 17, labelled as terrorism or otherwise. It is 
not until DTN 28, published in March 2012, that this is mentioned. 
This was in response to the shooting in Liege a few months 
previously by somebody without any clear political motive. This 
threat assessment mentions both Karst Tates and Tristan van der 
Vlis, the perpetrator of the shooting in Alphen aan de Rijn in 2011, 
in which there were six fatalities. Both perpetrators were placed 
under the heading of “violent lone actors”.65
Nor did the attack of Anders Breiivik as mentioned above give cause 
to open the DTN with something other than the jihadist threat. 
Another example is formed by the terrorist activities of the 
Nationalsozialistischer Untergrund (NSU) under Beate Zschäpe. 
These activities led to at least ten fatalities, which caused great 
commotion in Germany. Very little attention was paid to this 
grouping in the DTN. The first mention of this was made a few 
months after Zschäpe was arrested in November 2011. DTN 28 
(March 2012) reports that “ten unsolved murders, most of which 
involving people Turkish nationality in the period from 2000 – 2006 
were committed by the Nationalsozialistischer Untergrund (NSU),  
a right-wing extremist group”.66 No mention was made of the 
criticism of the German intelligence and security services, claiming 
that they had focused too much on the threat of jihadism and that 
right-wing extremists had slipped through the net as a result of this.
Forms of threat
Although the threat assessments are fairly clear about the ideological 
background of the threat - in most cases jihadism, but also left- and 
right-wing extremists and animal activists - the type of threat faced 
by the Netherlands is not always clear. A wide range of threats are 
considered: the known threat and the unknown threat, the 
predictable threat, the potential and concrete threats, and the 
domestic and international threats.
63 Idem, p.5.
64 National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, 
GTD ID 200905010021, consulted on 24-11-2015, http://www.start.umd.edu/
gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=200905010021.
65 DTN 28, p.4.
66 DTN 28, p.4.
DTN 8 explains how this works. A type of threat is the concrete 
threat, also known as the known threat: the “threat identified by 
the security authorities at network or personal level. Since it seemed 
that the concrete threat in the Netherlands was declining, based in 
this case on the reduced presence of domestic jihadist networks, the 
focal point of the threat considerations shifted to the potential 
threat”.67 The potential threat, also known as the conceivable 
threat, is defined as “given the experiences of 11 September 2011,  
a threat manifestation that cannot be ruled out but for which the 
security authorities do not have any concrete indications”.68 How 
this is worded is remarkable. It seems as though in the absence of 
concrete indications and direct developments giving cause for 
concern, one thinks more in terms of what is possible, or what 
could possibly come to pose a threat. Ultimately it was decided after 
all to lower the threat level in DTN 8. This was because (among 
other things) “it did not prove possible to firm up potential threats” 
and resistance among Muslim groups had intensified.
There are of course a number of practical problems involved in 
charting the unknown threat. What resources are available to 
estimate the seriousness and scope of a threat if the threat itself is 
unknown? All that can be done in the case is to consider the 
possible implications of a certain type of attack. This mainly covers 
certain “low-probability, high-impact” scenarios, such as an attack 
using CBRN weapons. A difficult situation arises here when it comes 
to a threat analysis in which it is precisely the capability and intent 
of an actor that have to be estimated.69 It becomes very difficult to 
estimate this for an unknown threat when it is not known where 
the attack could come from. These “low-probability, high-impact” 
scenarios therefore lend themselves better to a risk assessment. 
DTN 8 makes it clear that it is difficult to attach certain conclusions 
to an “unknown” threat: as soon as it fails to manifest itself it 
disappears from the scene. The NCTV ultimately bases the threat 
level on the concrete threat, with concrete indications. Despite this 
it is sometimes the unknown threat that takes centre stage, where 
the conceivability of a certain attack - can we imagine this happe-
ning here? -  takes precedence over a specific attack - is this likely or 
expected to take place?
A concrete example is DTN 12 of March 2008, in which the threat 
level is raised to “substantial”. The DTN reports that “there are 
currently no concrete indications of attacks in the Netherlands”.70 
None the less, “during the course of DTN12 (…) the increased 
conceivability of an attack in the Netherlands identified in DTN 10 
and DTN 11 is continuing to rise”.71 Despite a lack of concrete 
67 DTN 8, p.2.
68 Idem, p.2.
69 For more information about the capability and intent of ‘home-grown’ 
terrorists in general and the Netherlands in particular, see Bart Schuurman 
and Quirine Eijkman, 2015, “Indicators of terrorist intent and capability: Tools 
for threat assessment”, Dynamics of Asymmetric Conflict, pp. 1-17.
70 DTN 12, p.3.
71 Idem.
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indications or developments it is the predictability of an attack that 
leads to a rise in the threat level. Added to that is the fact that it is 
also the “increase in the unknown threat, i.e. that posed by people 
or groups that are not yet in the sights of European Intelligence and 
Security Services” that contributes to the decision to raise the threat 
level. Reference is made in this regard to cases in surrounding 
countries in which it was not until a very advanced stage that 
perpetrators came into the picture or were not known to the 
security services.
The first question to be answered here is how it can be established 
that the unknown threat to the Netherlands has increased. Can this 
be attributed solely to the increased conceivability of such a threat? 
And what criteria are operated for the decision to raise the threat 
level despite the absence of signs of a concrete terrorist threat 
against the Netherlands? Placing the emphasis on the unknown 
threat does of course always offer a way out if a threat suddenly 
manifests itself: that was the unknown threat that we had already 
been warned of.
CBRN terrorism
A notable example of a specific threat placed mainly in the domain 
of the “predictability” or the ‘low-probability, high-impact” 
category is what is known as CBRN (chemical, biological, radiological 
and nuclear) terrorism. This form of terrorism hugely captures the 
imagination because the potential damage could be disastrous. Up 
until now terrorists have only barely succeeded in making use of 
CBRN weapons. Despite that, this is a regularly recurring theme in 
the DTNs. DTN 5, for example, mentions that in the autumn of 2005 
a “Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) Terro-
rism” steering committee was set up with the aim of reducing the 
likelihood of a CBRN attack and setting up a dedicated CBRN 
terrorism threat assessment.72 In most of the DTNs a fairly down-to-
earth approach is taken to the potential threat of CBRN terrorism. 
In DTN 7, for instance, mention is made in passing that “in the short 
term a greater risk is posed by home-made explosives than CBRN 
weapons”.73 But DTN 9 states that “the chance of chemical, 
biological, radiological or nuclear (CBRN) weapons being used in an 
attack in the Netherlands is judged, as in 2006, to be small but 
present. The most likely scenario is a small-scale chemical or 
biological attack aimed at individuals or a small group of people in 
an enclosed space”.74 CBRN terrorism is mentioned once again in 
DTN 15. In this DTN it is stated that “in view of the disproportionate 
impact of a CBRN attack, there is and remains a need for a coordinated 
approach at national level, aimed at minimising the chance of 
CBRN terrorism”.75 
72 DTN 5, p.13.
73 DTN 7, p.1.
74 DTN 9, p.1.
75 DTN 15, p. 8.
Salafism
Salafism is another important theme covered by various DTNs . The 
variable attitude to this orthodox movement within Islam is a 
notable aspect of this. DTN 6 sets out five factors that contribute to 
the ongoing radicalisation of Muslim youths in the Netherlands. 
One of these factors is the growth of non-violent Salafism in many 
mosques.76 This is also reflected in DTN 14, in which an explanation 
is given in the chapter on “resistance” of how the “moderate 
mosques” are gaining ground in respect of the Salafists.77 Conversely, 
DTN 18 highlights the positive side of Salafism as a non-violent 
counterpart of jihadism. The next DTN makes specific reference to 
the heightened resistance of Salafist centres, which are becoming 
more and more likely to bar entry to “radical youths with jihadist 
ideas.78
Foreign fighters
A theme that has occupied a high position on the agenda since the 
raising of the threat level in DTN 32 of March 2013 is that of “foreign 
fighters”, or “foreign terrorist fighters” This has been reported on in 
detail throughout the years, with the number of Dutch civilians 
fighting in Syria and Iraq being regularly updated. A lot of attention 
is also paid to potential ‘returnees’. It is however interesting to note 
the extent to which this theme was previously an issue. The use of 
terminology on this theme is shown in figure 4, ranging from 
possible expressions from “Iraq jihadists”, “Syria volunteers” to 
simply “foreign fighters”. This shows that the phenomenon has 
been in the picture since the very first threat assessment and that 
this always recurs a couple of times throughout the years, but that 
the big rise took place after March 2013.
Resilience
Another theme that arises in the threat assessments is resilience 
and resistance. Paul Abels highlighted this as an important subject 
because “the extent to which a government, society and specific 
population groups are willing and able to offer resistance to certain 
threats also affects the threat itself”.79
This resistance is not a constant factor but varies throughout the 
years. The first threat assessments were not especially positive on 
the subject of resilience, especially the resilience of the Muslim 
community in the Netherlands when it comes to resisting radicali-
sation. A positive trend was gradually established here, which is 
expressed in DTN 3, for example, as “on the resistance side the 
increase in resilience among Muslims appears to be continuing. 
Some mosques showed themselves to actively oppose radicalisation”.80 
This resilience continues, and is therefore given in DTN 8 as one of 
the most important reasons for lowering the threat level. In the 
76 DTN 6, p.2.
77 DTN 14, p. 4.
78 DTN 15, p.3.
79 Abels, “Dreigingsbeeld Terrorisme Nederland”, p. 538.
80 DTN 6, p.6.
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years to follow we frequently find the following sentence: “resistan-
ce among the Dutch population to violent radicalism, extremism 
and terrorism remains as strong as ever.”
After December 2012 there is a change in tone: DTN 31 warns against 
the fact that there has been a reduction in the attention paid to 
issues concerning radicalisation and terrorism in Dutch society.81
Six months later, in DTN 33, the NCTV no longer speaks of resilience 
that is “as strong as ever”.82 This DTN asserts that the Dutch 
population “remains generally resilient”.83 DTN 35 states that there 
are no signs that resilience has significantly reduced, but that there 
are “worrying signs that resilience in Muslim communities is being 
increasingly placed under pressure”.84 In DTN 36 this even changes 
to “concerns about resilience in the Muslim population in the 
longer term”.85
After DTN 36 resilience appears to rise again in the Netherlands. 
Mention is again made of the fact that the Dutch population is 
“generally” resilient. However, a critical comment can be made on 
this subject. Although resilience is referred to in general terms, it is 
81 DTN 31, p.2.
82 DTN 33, p.2.
83 DTN 33, p.2.
84 DTN 35, p.6.
85 DTN 36, p.7.
only the resilience of the Muslim community that is specifically 
considered. When mention is made of right-wing extremism, for 
example, nothing is said about the resilience among groups that 
could be sensitive to this. DTN 10 forms a concrete example in 
which worrying signals about right-wing extremism are described. 
It is stated in this DTN that “just a few hundred youths” are linked to 
extreme right-wing parties such as Blood and Honour.86 One would 
then expect to see a passage concerning the resilience of native 
Dutch youths in relation to right-wing extremist influences, but this 
is not forthcoming.
Use of terminology
Having considered a number of the substantive lines of the threat 
assessments, we turn now to the use of terminology in DTNs over 
the past ten years. Figure 5 shows the cumulative use of terminology 
in these forty DTNs.87 As we would expect, we see the words “the 
Netherlands” and “threat” at the top of this list. The various terms 
concerning the phenomenon of jihadism are more notable. The 
words “international”, “countries” and “European” are high up on 
the list and indicate that the DTN is strongly internationally 
oriented.
86 DTN 10, p.3.
87 Not including articles and irrelevant verbs, without capitals, with the aid of 
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 Figure 4   Use of terminology concerning “foreign fighters”. Terms marked* have been merged with  
comparable terms.  
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If we then considered the words “Islam”, “Islamic”, “Muslims” and 
“jihadist” we see that the use of “Islamic” has remained fairly 
constant, the use of “Muslims” has reduced during the past five 
years and the use of the word “jihadist” has risen sharply since DTN 
16. It should be emphasised that there are sometimes big differen-
ces between the DTNs. It is notable that the word “Islamic”, which 
frequently occurred in DTN 1, appears to have been replaced in most 
cases thereafter with the term “jihadist” (see figure 6).
..................................................................................................
 Figure 5  Use of terminology in DTN 1 - 40 
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  Figure 6  Use of the words “islamist”, “islamic”, “muslims” and “jihadist”
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In the previous paragraphs we considered the content of ten years 
of DTNs. However, much has also happened surrounding the DTN. 
The first DTN was published in a different political and administrative 
setting and with a different coordinator from DTN 40. During the 
past ten years there have been three different national coordinators 
who served under different governments and worked for different 
ministers. From 2005 to 2007 the responsible ministers were from 
the CDA and VVD, between 2007 and 2010 from the CDA and PvdA 
and from 2010 the NCTV was led by various VVD ministers (see 
appendix I). The first DTN was drawn up by the NCTb, a relatively 
small governmental agency manned by counterterrorism specia-
lists. From October 2012 this was the NCTV, which was responsible 
not only for the counterterrorism policy, but also for a wide range of 
other security issues, ranging from crisis management in general to 
cyber security. There was also a change in the positioning of the 
NCTb/NCTV. In 2010 there were two responsible ministers: the 
Minister of Justice and the Minister of the Interior and Kingdom 
Relations. From 2010 this was the minister of the ‘new’ Ministry of 
Security and Justice. There was more continuity regarding the 
coordinators themselves: The first coordinator, Tjibbe Joustra, 
headed the NCTb for five years. His successor, Erik Akerboom, held 
this position for almost four years. The third coordinator, Dick 
Schoof, will shortly be starting his fourth year. The coordinators 
have thus provided continuity in a rather changeable political and 
administrative setting.
Within that setting the DTNs also played an important role in the 
political debate on terrorism and counterterrorism. In the period 
from the end of 2006 to 2009 and after 2012 the DTNs were paid a 
lot of attention in the House of Representatives and in various 
parliamentary documents and government papers. Figure 7 shows 
the number of official announcements88 between May 2005 and 
November 2015. The fall in the number of announcements after 
2009 appears to be linked to the lowering of the threat level in 
November 2009 and the recent increase in the number of 
announcements to its elevation in the spring of 2013.
DTN in the news
As touched on above, the DTNs have received a lot of media 
attention. The same applies to the author of the DTN, the coordinator. 
The person of the NCTb/NCTV has developed into a public figure 
since 2005. It is hard to find an example of a top civil servant with a 
higher public profile. This person thus plays an important role in 
communicating on the terrorist threat and the explanation of the 
DTN to the general public. During the past ten years the three 
coordinators have been guests more than once on well-known and 
popular TV programmes such as NOVA/Nieuwsuur or Buitenhof. 
They have also been frequently quoted in the written media and 
various newspapers of record such as NRC Handelsblad, Volkskrant 
and Trouw have published comprehensive interviews with the 
coordinators. One of the interviews that caused a degree of 
controversy concerning the DTN was the farewell interview of 
coordinator Tjibbe Joustra with NRC Handelsblad in December 
2008: In this interview he said that the threat level was higher than 
ever. He even referred to it as “substantial plus”, and also said that 
compared to the situation three years ago, when the level was also 
88 Based on the results from a database of Overheid.nl with the official 
announcements (Staatscourant, Staatsblad, Tractatenblad, Gemeenteblad, 
Provinciaal blad, Waterschapsblad, Blad gemeenschappelijke regeling) of the 
government and the parliamentary documents. Searched under “Dreigings-
beeld terrorisme Nederland” https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/.
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“substantial”, he was also forced to conclude that “the issues now 
underlying this are actually more serious”. 89
The form, usefulness and need for the DTN were also addressed 
during the launch of the threat assessment and in the recent debate 
on threat levels. Shortly following the publication of the first DTN, 
for example, NRC Handelsblad published an article on the role 
played by the NCTb regarding providing citizens with information 
on terrorism.90 
This showed that experts are divided on the question of whether the 
government should or should not keep the public informed about 
terrorism. Some took the view that this could cause anxiety, 
whereas others argued that a reticent approach on the govern-
ment’s part could be dangerous.91 That debate also took place 
concerning the concept of threat assessments following the 
elevated terrorist threat in Brussels. The announcement of level 
4 - ‘very serious’ in the Brussels-Capital Region led to the metro 
being closed down, events being cancelled and many restaurants 
and cafés remaining closed in response to fears of an attack. The 
Volkskrant responded to this by organising on 21 November 2015 an 
online opinion poll with the following proposition: “the placing of 
the terrorist threat in ‘levels’ is unnecessary and does nothing but 
cause panic.” Of the more than three thousand respondents, 47% 
agreed with this proposition and 53% disagreed.92 Although this is 
an online poll, it shows that the public seems divided on the 
usefulness and need for a threat level, and that this could present a 
challenge regarding how such levels are communicated.
89 Ahmet Olgun, “Gevaar, hoe ziet dat eruit?”, NRC Handelsblad, 30-07-2005, 
http://vorige.nrc.nl/dossiers/moslimterreur/politiek_reacties_en_beleidtot0/ 
article1868324.ece.
90 Olgun, “Gevaar, hoe ziet dat eruit?”.
91  Idem.
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6 Conclusion  
and reflection
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Ten years after the publication of the first Terrorist Threat Assess-
ment for the Netherlands this global analysis of the terrorist threat 
is a subject of close scrutiny. Threat analyses and threat estimates 
have drawn a great deal of media attention since the attacks in Paris 
in November 2015 and the announcements of ‘level 4/’very serious’ 
for Brussels. The DTN, in some cases supplemented by Parliamentary 
Letters93, has become the government’s principal means of 
communication regarding radicalisation, terrorism and counter-
terrorist measures. We have given below a brief summary of the 
most important findings of the study of the threat assessments over 
the past ten years and the features of the DTN in itself. Finally, we 
reflect briefly on the future of the DTN.
Focus on jihadism
The analysis of the DTNs themselves shows that the key issue is the 
jihadist threat and, increasingly, ‘foreign fighters’. It is also clear 
that the threat levels depend mainly on extent to which domestic 
jihadist networks are present, but also that developments abroad 
play a major role. The threat level also depends on the degree of 
resistance within Muslim communities. There have been changing 
attitudes to Salafism throughout the course of years: sometimes it is 
regarded as a factor that contributes to radicalism, and sometimes it 
is described as a non-violent counterpart of jihadism. Other forms 
of extremism or terrorism are paid relatively little attention, and 
right-wing extremism in particular sometimes appears to be 
somewhat trivialised.
What is it?
When we consider the form of the Terrorist Threat Assessment for 
the Netherlands a simple question, but one that is very hard to 
answer, arises: what exactly is the DTN? Is it an impression of the 
threat as the Dutch word ‘dreigingsbeeld’, or ‘threat image’, would 
imply - a qualitative description of the threat - or a ‘threat assess-
ment’ - a proper assessment of the threat - as it is termed in 
English?
There is no straightforward answer to this question. The DTN 
contains elements of both. A threat level is attached to the 
qualitative description of the threat, which also gives the DTN the 
characteristics of a threat estimate. It is usually somewhat unclear 
how that description relates to the threat level. This could be a 
conscious choice. After all, when the DTN was brought into being it 
was emphasised that it was not the intention to create an impression 
that the threat could be quantified. For that reason it was decided to 
operate just four, rather than five or more levels as is done in other 
countries. The underlying idea of this was that operating just a few 
categories with a wide bandwidth would rule out the suggestion 
that the threat could be quantified.
93 Examples include the Prime Minister’s letter to the Speaker of the House of 
Representatives of the States General of 17 November on the attacks in Paris.
This field of tension or ambiguity between whether we want to 
quantify the threat is clearly reflected in the various DTNs. DTN 3, 
for example, mentions that a “weighting” is applied between the 
various factors, ultimately leading to a certain threat level.94 
Reading between the lines we see that this consideration ultimately 
comprises two important components: the threat on the one hand 
and the resistance against it as a mitigating factor on the other.95 
However, nowhere is an explanation given of what weighting is 
assigned to which factors and how this resistance could actually 
affect the threat level. The authors of the DTN appear thus to want 
to distance themselves from making a threat estimate. But 
including resistance in the analysis and linking threat levels to the 
DTN makes the DTN more than a threat assessment alone.
If we consider the current debate on the classification ‘substantial’ 
for the current threat level, we see that many people regard the DTN 
as being mainly a threat estimate rather than an ‘image’ of the 
situation. This is not made any clearer by the fact that the DTN is 
referred to in English as a threat assessment, as opposed - as 
touched on above - to the Dutch term that could literally be 
translated as ‘threat image’.
Criteria
The operation of certain threat levels would have to meet at least 
two conditions. First, as with any form of categorisation, the levels 
have to follow on logically from each other, with each higher level 
representing a clear rise in one or more of the accompanying 
properties or criteria. This would also have to actually say some-
thing about the intention and capacities of individuals or groups to 
perpetrate an attack and about the resistance referred to in the 
DTNs. This is unclear, at least to the reader of the public version. But 
the list of criteria given on the NCTV website (see appendix III) gives 
rise to many questions. It is notable, for example, that some criteria 
(e.g. the presence of national and international terrorist networks) 
are mentioned for only one of the levels. There are also doubts 
about the value of certain criteria. The absence of new trends or 
phenomena that pose a threat is not in itself a reason to operate a 
threat level ‘limited’. It could just as well be true that an existing 
group has been carrying out terrorist activities for years and is still 
doing so. It is also interesting to note that a resistance factor 
suddenly makes its entry at level “minimal”: the “open society”. 
How exactly an open society could affect the chance of success of a 
plot hatched by an individual or small group is unclear. This is 
usually better explained in the threat assessments themselves, but 
the reader none the less sometimes finds himself having to guess 
which criteria are most applicable at the moment and which are not 
really relevant when it comes to determining the threat level.
94 DTN 3, p.2.
95 Resistance amounts to two elements: In most cases it concerns the 
resistance or resilience of the Islamic communities in the Netherlands, with 
the effect of countermeasures as the second element.
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Four or more levels?   
Regarding the number of threat levels the question is whether just 
four of them gives the NCTV enough space to categorise the 
complex and ever-changing threat. Furthermore, in practice only 
two rather than four levels are operated: the level “minimal” - alt-
hough theoretically possible - will hardly ever be used in practice. 
It is possible that the level “critical” will only be used following an 
attack if one of the perpetrators or known accomplices are still at 
large. This is illustrated by recent events in Brussels. This means that 
in practice there are only two usable levels: “limited” and “substan-
tial”. The question remains of the extent to which these two 
categories are sufficient to reflect the considerable movement in the 
terrorist threat to the Netherlands. When Tjibbe Joustra referred to a 
“substantial plus” level in 2008 he appeared to be indicating that 
the boundaries of this level’s bandwidth had been reached and the 
term “substantial” sometimes no longer covers the situation. 
As mentioned above, the level ‘critical’ is of a different order in view 
of the criterion “very strong indications”. This gives rise to the 
question of whether at least five levels are needed to better 
categorise the bandwidth of the terrorist threat in general. 
Following the British example, the category ‘severe’ could be 
inserted between ‘substantial’ and ‘critical’.
Added value of the levels 
The question ultimately boils down to precisely how valuable the 
threat levels are. If the main purpose of the Terrorist Threat 
Assessment for the Netherlands is to provide an impression of the 
threat rather than a estimate of the threat, it is questionable 
whether it is advisable to link the threat levels to this image. Setting 
levels, whether four or forty, suggests that the threat is quantifiable, 
and that proves very difficult in practice. The government could 
therefore decide to abolish the threat levels. This would bring an 
end to debates about whether a given threat fits within the 
bandwidth of a threat level. A DTN without threat levels would also 
make it possible to give a detailed explanation of the direction in 
which the threat is moving. The downside is that this would do 
away with the ability to inform the general public of how serious 
the threat is in a single word or a couple of sentences. This also 
makes it possible to give a range of politicians and ‘experts’ the 
ability to label the threat image and, accordingly, to further 
politicise the terrorist threat.
Communication
That takes us to a final and important objective of the Terrorist 
Threat Assessment for the Netherlands: the DTN as a means of 
communication. The public version of the DTN is undoubtedly a 
successful instrument for informing the public and the House of 
Representatives about the terrorist threat against the Netherlands 
and Dutch interests abroad. It is given a lot of media attention and 
is read by many. The NCTV’s website statistics show that there has 
been a gradual rise in the number of visits to the DTN website and 
the current threat level, especially following terrorist incidents and 
changes to the threat level.96 The number has risen sharply over the 
past few years. The number of visits to the DTN page and the page 
showing the current threat level in particular shot up following the 
raising of the threat level in March 2013. This year the number of 
visits rose to more than 11,000 visits in November 2015.97
Apart from this increased interest, the question remains of the 
extent to which the DTN and the threat levels contribute to mentally 
preparing the public for counterterrorist measures and the 
possibility of an attack. Nor is it known whether more attention 
being paid to the DTN leads to a rise in alertness and/or whether 
members of the public and companies see actual perspectives for 
action in the DTN. It is also unclear whether the DTN contributes to 
increasing the resilience of the public, the business community and 
public authorities, or whether this ultimate leads to unnecessary 
concern or even more fear of terrorism. The fact that the Nether-
lands is at times the country most fearful of terrorism in Europe - 
despite the relatively small number of terrorist incidents in its own 
territory - makes this question even more pressing.98 It also goes to 
show how difficult it is to communicate threats, certainly in 
situations where several and exceptionally bloody attacks take place 
in surrounding countries.
The future
There have now been no fewer than forty editions of the Terrorist 
Threat Assessment for the Netherlands over a ten-year period. One 
would expect the form and nature of the DTN to have changed 
‘substantially’ over the years, certainly given the many political and 
administrative changes affecting the authors of the DTN and the 
turbulent times in which we live. It is therefore perhaps one of the 
most striking observations when reading forty DTNs that, in fact, 
not very much has changed. Not only regarding its nature and form, 
but even regarding the essence of its content.
This continuity contributes on the one hand to the recognisability 
and familiarity of the DTN as a means of communication, and 
makes the threat assessment a constant factor as a “substantive 
basis and guideline” for the Dutch counterterrorism policy. On the 
other hand, the societal, political and administrative context in 2015 
could give cause to once again carefully consider whether the threat 
assessment and the related threat levels need to be changed, and 
whether the tenth anniversary is a good point at which to do this.
96 NCTV visit statistics website page “Dreigingsniveau Terrorisme 
Nederland” and page “Actueel dreigingsniveau”.
97 Idem.
98 See, for example, the six-monthly Eurobarometer of the European 
Commission.
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Coordinators:
•  2004 - 2009: Tjibbe Joustra
•  2009 - 2012: Erik Akerboom
•  2013 - present: Dick Schoof
The NCTb/NCTV dates back to 2004 and has served under the following governments:
•  Balkenende II (CDA, VVD, D66)
•  Balkenende III (CDA, VVD)
•  Balkenende IV (CDA, PvdA, CU),
•  Rutte I (VVD, CDA)
•  Rutte II (VVD, PvdA).
Up until 2010 the Ministers of Justice and for the Interior and Kingdom Relations were responsible for the coordinator, this has the Minister of 
Security and Justice since 2010. From 2004 to 2007 the responsible ministers were from the CDA and the VVD, between 2007 and 2010 from the 
CDA and the PvdA, and from 2010 to the time of writing the VVD provided a Minister of Security and Justice twice, see the chart below.
Year Coordinator Government Responsible
2004 Tjibbe Joustra Balkenende II (CDA, VVD, D66) Ministers of Justice and the Interior  
and Kingdom Relations CDA- VVD
2005 Tjibbe Joustra Balkenende II (CDA, VVD, D66) Ministers of Justice and the Interior 
and Kingdom Relations CDA- VVD
2006 Tjibbe Joustra Balkenende III (CDA, VVD) Ministers of Justice and the Interior 
and Kingdom Relations CDA- VVD
2007 Tjibbe Joustra Balkenende IV (CDA, PvdA, CU) Ministers of Justice and the Interior 
and Kingdom Relations CDA- PvdA
2008 Tjibbe Joustra Balkenende IV (CDA, PvdA, CU) Ministers of Justice and the Interior 
and Kingdom Relations CDA- PvdA
2009 Erik Akerboom Balkenende IV (CDA, PvdA, CU) Ministers of Justice and the Interior
and Kingdom Relations CDA- PvdA
2010 Erik Akerboom Rutte I (VVD, CDA) - Support PVV the Minister of Security and Justice VVD 
2011 Erik Akerboom Rutte I (VVD, CDA) - Support PVV the Minister of Security and Justice VVD
2012 Erik Akerboom Rutte II (VVD, PvdA) the Minister of Security and Justice VVD
2013 Dick Schoof Rutte II (VVD, PvdA) the Minister of Security and Justice VVD
2014 Dick Schoof Rutte II (VVD, PvdA) the Minister of Security and Justice VVD
2015 Dick Schoof Rutte II (VVD, PvdA) the Minister of Security and Justice VVD
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Distinction between DTN and ATb
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Terrorist Threat Assessment for the  
Netherlands
Alert system for counterterrorism
For whom? Citizens, companies and public authorities Government and business sectors
Objective Gives a general impression of the potential 
threat in the Netherlands: how likely is it that a 
terrorist attack will take place somewhere in the 
Netherlands? Serves for information purposes 
and for policy development by the government
Provides a specific impression of the potential 
or actual threat in a certain business sector or a 
certain area. Intended to be able to quickly put 
security measures in place in the event of an 
elevated threat 
Threat levels • Minimal
• Limited
• Substantial
• Critical        
• Basic level
• Slight threat
•  Moderate threat
• High threat       
Threat 
applicable to
The whole of the Netherlands, not place-
related: how likely is it that our country will face 
a terrorist threat?
Related sector in which a threat has been 
identified
Measures The DTN is too general to take security 
measures based solely on it
Depending on the threat level a package of 
security measures is put in place, both by the 
sector and the government
Source: https://www.nctv.nl/onderwerpen/tb/dtn-atb.aspx/.
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Appendix III:
Structure of the 
four threat levels
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Level Some accompanying criteria
Minimal • There are barely any national or international terrorist networks
• It is unlikely that attacks are being planned
•  This level is maintained by the open society and the nature of the risk of a modern society                 
Limited • No new trends or phenomena that present a threat have been identified
• The activities of terrorist networks have been hindered
•  The Netherlands is not or is only barely mentioned in the statements of terrorist networks that 
can be taken seriously              
Substantial • New trends and phenomena that present a threat have been identified
• There is a realistic chance of an attack taking place in the Netherlands
• Attacks are taking place in other countries similar to the Netherlands
• Radicalisation and recruitment are taking place on a considerable scale
•  The Netherlands is frequently mentioned in the statements of terrorist networks that can be 
taken seriously             
Critical • There are strong indications that an attack will take place in the Netherlands
• An attack has taken place in the Netherlands and subsequent attacks are very likely
•  The Netherlands is frequently mentioned in the statements of terrorist networks that are taken 
very seriously, and a serious threat is posed to specific targets
Source: https://www.nctv.nl/onderwerpen/tb/dtn/opbouw/. 
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